Audit Partner Tenure and Audit Quality: An Empirical Analysis by Mgbame, Chijoke Oscar et al.
European Journal of Business and Management                                                     www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol 4, No.7, 2012 
 
 
154 
 
Audit Partner Tenure and Audit Quality: An Empirical Analysis 
 
Chijoke Oscar Mgbame
* 
 Emmanuel Eragbhe  Nosakhare Peter Osazuwa
 
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Benin, Nigeria 
*Email of corresponding author: chijioke.mgbame@uniben.edu 
Abstract  
The objective of this study was to provide an evidence on the existence or otherwise of a relationship between the 
tenure of auditor and audit quality in Nigeria. The Binary Logit Model estimation technique was use to analyze the 
relationship between the tenure of an auditor and audit quality. Findings reveal that there is a negative relationship 
between auditor tenure and audit quality though the variable was not significant. The other explanatory variables 
(ROA, Board Independence, and Director Ownership and Board size) considered alongside auditor tenure were 
found to be inversely related to audit quality aside from Returns on Assets which exhibited a positive effect. The 
recommendation is that there is the need for the financial reporting council and other regulatory bodies in line with 
best practices to look critically into the issue of auditor tenure and the impact on audit quality in Nigeria.      
Keywords: Audit quality, Audit tenure, Auditing and financial reporting 
 
1. Introduction  
Audit involves performing procedures to obtain evidence about amounts and disclosures in the financial statements 
so as to evaluate the appropriateness of accounting estimates made by management (KPMG, 2008). The Audit quality 
therefore, is a basic ingredient in enhancing the credibility of financial statements to users of accounting information. 
Consequently, studies (Fairchild, 2008; Coate, Florence and Kral 2002) note that audits add credibility to the 
financial information by providing an independent verification of management-provided financial reports, thus 
reducing investors information risk. Financial reporting credibility is partly reflected in the confidence of users in 
audited financial reports (Watkins, Hillison, and Morecroft. 2004). As noted by Levitt (2000), the perception of audit 
quality plays a critical role in maintaining systematic confidence in the integrity of financial reporting. The higher the 
perceived audit quality, the more credible the financial statements. This will consequently improve user’s confidence 
in those financial statements. Concerns about audit quality have gained increased ascendancy especially as a result of 
the spectacular financial reporting scandals in major corporations, such as Enron, WorldCom and other companies. 
The aftermath of these scandals has led to the identification of a perceived “expectation gap” in the audit quality as 
many users of audited financial statements have different expectations of the audit function from what it actually 
delivers (Beattie, Brandt and Fearnley, 1999).Therefore, there has been a call for sweeping changes in the auditing 
profession to ensure improved audit quality (Auditing Profession 2002). 
However, the non quantitative nature of “audit quality” as a variable has necessitated the existence of a plethora of 
proxies and indicators for its measurement (Cameran, Prencipe and Trombette 2007). De Angelo (1991) defined 
audit quality as the probability that an auditor will both discover and truthfully report material errors, 
misrepresentation and omissions detected in a clients accounting system. This probability depends upon the broad 
concept of an auditor’s professional conduct, which includes factors as objectivity, due professionalism and conflict 
of interest. Some studies (Francis 2004, and Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002) measure audit quality in terms of audit or 
reporting failure, based on the idea that audit quality is inversely related to audit or reporting failures. Other studies 
(Nagy, 2005; Myers, Omer & Myers, 2003) use earnings as a surrogate for audit quality. The implicit assumption is 
that high audit quality implies high earnings quality (Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds. 2002). Wallace (1980) notes 
that a measure of audit quality is the audit’s ability to reduce noise, bias and improve the fineness in accounting 
information.  Researchers have also used estimated discretionary accruals as a surrogate for audit quality (Dechow 
& Dicheve, 2002; and Krushman, 2003) assuming that higher estimated discretionary accruals reflect lower earnings 
quality and thus lower audit quality. Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) note that audit quality is measured by the 
propensity of the auditor to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) after controlling for other factors that might affect 
this decision. Finally, Modrich, Jackson and Roebuck (2007) note that true audit quality is when the audit does not 
result in a type 1 error: a failing company being given an unqualified report or a type 11 error: a non-failing company 
being given a qualified report. 
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All of the divergences with regards to the appropriate measure of audit quality may be seen to reflect the need by 
researches to monitor and provide indices amenable to control so as to make inferences on the audit quality, as the 
need to monitor necessarily should be preceded by the ability to define. Consequently, studies (Arrunada and 
Paz-Ares, 1997; Healey and Kim, 2003; Brody and Moscove, 1998) have attempted to identify possible control 
variables for the state of audit quality. In the light of these studies, auditor tenure has become the focus of much 
debate. The resulting dilemma is that the firm is faced with the decision of whether to replace its auditors after a 
period of time or to build and maintain a long-term relationship with the audit firm. The outcome is at polarity with 
conflicting findings. While some researchers have identified the need and have provided justification for auditor 
rotation (Healy and Kim, 2003; Ebimobowei and Oyadonghan 2011; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002) others argue on 
positive effects of tenure on audit quality (Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Adeyemi and Okpala 2011;Defond and Francis, 
2005). This study aims to provide empirical evidence from Nigeria as the challenge of auditor tenure and client 
relationship though still budding has not attracted much analytical attention in the Nigerian audit setting.  
2. Statement of the Problem 
Several studies (Arrunada and Paz-Ares, 1997; Healey and Kim, 2003; Brody and Moscove, 1998; Dopuch, King 
and Schwartiz, 2001; Myers et al 2003) have attempted to evaluate possible explanatory variables for the state of 
audit quality. In the light of these studies, auditor tenure has become the focus of much debate. Should a firm replace 
its auditors on a regular basis, or should the   auditor be allowed to build a   long-term relationship with the client? 
Studies on the impact of auditor tenure on audit quality are at polarity.  A considerable number of these studies 
(Healy and Kim, 2003; AICPA, 1992; Carcello and Nagy, 2004) consider rotation of audit firms as a way of 
improving audit quality. This is because familiarity with the client has the effect of reducing the fresh point of view 
auditors have in the early years of engagement. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 consolidates this view as it requires 
rotation of the lead audit partner every five years so that the engagement can be viewed “with fresh and skeptical 
eyes.” The argument basically is that longer auditor- tenure tends to result in an opportunity cost of auditor 
independence. Conversely,  other studies (Ghosh and Moon,2005; Defond and Francis,2005; Jenkins and 
Velury,2008) also argue that longer auditor tenure improves audit quality as auditors may need time to gain expertise 
in the business they audit and acquire client-specific knowledge over time. This implies that audit quality is lower 
during the early years of the Auditor- Client relationship, and audit quality increases with length of auditor-tenure 
due to the reduction in information asymmetry between auditor and client (Azizkhani, Monroe and Shailer 2006).  
However, in the Nigerian audit setting, the challenge of auditor tenure and client relationship though still budding 
has not attracted much analytical attention and empirical studies beyond mere anecdotal opinions. Consequently, 
there has been a dearth of research in this area and inadequate empirical evidence from Nigeria. Thus, the study will 
provide empirical evidence from Nigeria on the existence or otherwise of a relationship between tenure of auditor 
and audit quality.  
 
3. Objective of the Study 
The objective of the study is specified thus; 
1. To examine the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality in Nigeria.  
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Barbadillo and Aguilar (2008) in a study to of the relationship between the duration of audit engagement and audit 
quality specified a model to show the functional relationship between the dependent variable (value of audit quality) 
and the main explanatory factor (tenure). Using a sample of non-financial Spanish companies quoted on Madrid 
Stock Exchange, the study reveals an inverse relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality and suggest that 
auditors tend to be more dependent in the first years of the auditing engagement. The study concludes that the shorter 
the auditor’s tenure, the more they behave in a dependent fashion. 
According to Ebimobowei and Oyadonghan (2011), auditors may be engaged in a long term audit–client relationship 
and there may be different incentives for this. Such long term professional affiliation may signal skepticism with 
regards to the perception of the auditor’s objectivity, independence and audit quality. The findings of the study show 
that there is a statistical significant relationship between mandatory rotation of auditors and the quality of audit 
reports. The study concludes that a policy favoring mandatory rotation of auditors could have positive effects on the 
quality of audit reports as it would allow for fresh approach and restore public confidence in the audit function.  
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Adeyemi and Okpala (2011) notes that an audit firm’s tenure can result in a loss of auditor’s independence. A long 
audit-client relationship could lead to an alignment of the auditors interest and that of its client which makes truly 
independent behaviour of the auditor a probability.  The study concluded that audit firm rotation does not 
necessarily enhance audit independence in Nigeria. This could be due to the unity of professional attitude among 
auditors and similarity in cultural bias and orientation. 
According to Johnson et al (2002), as the auditor-client relationship lengthens, there is the tendency that auditors 
may develop a “learned confidence” in the client which may result in the auditor not performing religiously, the 
required testing of financial reports. This learned confidence results in the auditor making assumptions about 
outcomes and using less rigorous audit procedures or static audit programmes. Potentially, a loop hole for a decline 
in audit quality has been created.  
Arrunada and Paz-Ares (1998) argue that a long auditor–client relationship may result to the development of 
personal relationship that may lead to the bonds of loyalty, trust or emotive relationships been developed between the 
client and the auditor. The implication is that truly independent auditor behaviour becomes difficult and there is the 
increased likelihood of the auditor acceding to client’s pressure in relation to their choice and application of 
accounting policies. This adversely affects the auditor’s independence and ability to offer a true and fair audit report.   
Summer (1998) analyses the hypothesis that audit tenure can enhance audit quality. This test was carried out within 
the framework of a stylized game model between borrowers, auditors and capital. When audit engagement lasts for 
two periods, the equilibrium entails that auditors report risky projects as risky, with a positive probability, in the first 
period. On the other hand, when the auditor engagement lasts only for one period, the equilibrium shows that 
auditors will report risky projects as safe in the first period. The study concludes that auditors are more unlikely to 
produce reporting quality in short term than in long term engagements and  tenure rotation  might have adverse 
effects on audit quality because it undermines the incentives for building up a reputation for honesty. 
Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2001) also examine the impact of auditor tenure on audit quality. The result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the auditor compromises his independence most often in a long term auditor 
contract and suggests that afterall auditor tenure may have significant effect on the audit quality. 
Hussey and Lan (2001) undertook a survey of U.K. financial directors on the impact of the duration of the 
auditor-client relationship on the audit quality. The findings revealed that majority of the respondents disagreed on 
the option of compulsory rotation of audit firms after a fixed number of years. A multiple regression analysis was 
further used in order to test the relationship between rotation and the other variables identified. These were the 
Finance Directors’ perception of audit quality, the costs of the audit. The results show that the perception of audit 
quality would be enhanced if rotation of audit tenure was most unlikely.  
Pierre and Anderson (1984) in their study consider the main factors that can lead clients and third parties to have 
conflicts with auditors which could result to lawsuits. Examining 129 legal cases tried between 1960 and 1973, the 
results show that thirty of the 129 cases analyzed involved auditors with less than three years of experience with the 
client. In terms of errors committed, they represent approximately 40% of the total errors committed, relating to 
accounting principle interpretation, audit procedural errors and fraud cases. The study therefore concludes that risks 
increases with shorter auditor tenure. 
Copley and Doucet, (1993) in an investigation of the relationship between the quality of audit services and auditor 
tenure in order to evaluate the usefulness of rotation, describe and tested a statistical model that is, a regression 
between the dependent variable “audit quality” and other independent variables, of which the most important is 
“tenure.” The results show a positive sign for the estimated parameter of “tenure”. This means that the likelihood of 
receiving a substandard quality audit increases with the length of the auditor – client relationship. In other words, the 
longer the period of engagement, the higher the risk of lower audit quality. 
Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) investigate the relationship between the length of the auditor-client relationship and 
audit reporting failures. Consequently, the objective was to test the relationship between auditor tenure and audit 
reporting failures. A sample of companies in the United States entering into bankruptcy during years 1996 – 1998 
were examined. A multivariate logistic regression was used, in which the endogenous variable was the audit report 
immediately preceding bankruptcy while the exogenous variables included auditor tenure amongst others. The result 
indicates the existence of a positive and significant relationship between tenure variable and audit reporting failures.  
Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) in a study, sought to examine if the length of the relationship between a 
company and audit firm is associated with financial reporting quality. The analysis was conducted using two 
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empirical proxies of quality (the absolute value of unexpected accruals and the relationship between current period 
accruals and future income). Three groups were then formed on the basis of the audit tenure (short – until 3 years, 
medium –between 4 and eight years, long-over 9 years). The model’s outcomes indicated that the level of unexpected 
accruals observed in the short tenure group of companies was higher than that reported by the medium tenure group. 
Furthermore, in the long tenure group, no significant increases in unexpected accruals were observed. In other words, 
short relationships are associated with higher unexpected accruals that are also less persistent in future earnings. 
These findings were also tested using multivariate and sensitivity analyses. As the financial reporting quality declines 
with short audit firm tenure, the study concludes that rotation may not be effective in enhancing audit quality. 
Myers, Myers and Omer (2003) using proxy variables such as discretionary accruals and current accruals, investigate 
the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality. The univariate results show that when auditor tenure is longer, 
the negative value of accrual measures was observed to be minimal.  Furthermore, the study also employed 
multivariate analysis in order to examine if the discovered relationship between tenure and accrual is also influenced 
by other factors. The relationship between auditor tenure and accrual measures was also observed to be consistent in 
multivariate analysis as in the univariate analysis.  On the other hand, the study found that extended auditor tenure 
had a beneficial effect on the dispersion of accruals. The implication is that there is the tendency for auditors to place 
greater constraints on both income increasing and income decreasing accruals as the audit client relation lengthens. 
These results suggest that audit quality does not appear to deteriorate with tenure. 
Vanstraelen (2000) examines the effect of long-term audit client relationship on audit quality. The external user’s 
perception of the audit report was used as the indicator for quality.  Utilizing the   logistic regression model,  the 
study findings shows that  long-term auditor client relationships is positively related with the increased likelihood 
of the auditor issuing an unqualified opinion. A significant difference was also found between the auditor’s reporting 
behaviour in the first two years versus the last year of the audit mandate. This implies that auditors are more willing 
to issue an unqualified audit report in the first two years of their official mandate than in the last year of their 
mandate. The policy implications of Vanstraelen (2000) support mandatory auditor rotation to maintain the value of 
an audit for the external users.   
Walker, Lewis and Casterella, (2001) provide empirical evidence relating to the link between the length of the audit 
engagement and audit failures. A logit model was used to predict failures. The results suggest that risk increases early 
on in audit client   relationship and then declines over long term periods. As the failure rate in long term 
engagements is low, the authors conclude that auditor rotation may not necessarily improve audit quality. 
Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) using a sample of stressed bankrupt companies, and stressed non-bankrupt 
companies in Belgium, provides evidence on the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality. The study measured audit 
quality as the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going concern opinion.  The study findings reveal that auditors do 
not necessarily become less independent as the audit duration increases neither is their ability to predict bankruptcy 
is improved with longer duration. The study concludes that the evidence for tenure either in signaling increasing or 
decreasing effect on audit quality is substantiated.  
Carcello and Nagy, (2004) also considered the relationship between audit quality and mandatory rotation of auditor’s 
tenure which is investigated from the point of view of fraudulent financial reporting.  A logistic regression model 
was used and the results reveal a significant positive relationship between short auditor tenure and audit quality. 
Nashwa (2004) using a sample of U.S companies, carried out a study to examine the relationship between long term 
auditor-client relationship and the probability of audit failure. A logit regression model was used to predict failure 
using tenure as the independent variable. The results indicate that risk increases early in the auditor client relation 
and then declines over time suggesting that longer audit tenure overtime will smoothen out any initial challenges that 
may impair the quality of the auditor’s performance. The results of the study do not support the hypothesis that short 
auditor tenure improves audit quality.  
In the light of the positions of various studies as reviewed above, we can argue that the effects of auditor tenure on 
audit quality are controversial. Moreover, few empirical studies use publicly available secondary data in order to 
determine whether perceived threats to auditor independence actually compromise auditor independence. Again, we 
could not access any documentary evidence from Nigeria in this subject area. Therefore, this study which was 
motivated by the lack of consensus in the literature on the impact of audit tenure on audit quality will contribute to 
the debate by examining the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality in Nigeria.  
Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis stated in the null: 
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HO:  There is a positive relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. 
 
5. Methodology 
Cross sectional data gathered from annual reports of selected quoted companies in Nigeria was used for this study. 
The data were from audits completed in 2010. A sample size of fifty (50) companies of the 199 listed equities was 
selected using the simple random sampling technique. Krejcie & Morgan (1970) in Amadi (2005) agrees with the 
sample as they proposed the population proportion of 0.05 as adequate to provide the maximum sample size required 
for generalization. The relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality was analyzed utilizing the binary logit 
model estimation technique. The choice of Maximum Likelihood (ML) binary logit regression model is based on the 
inability of the OLS multiple regression model to yield reliable coefficients and inference statistics in situation where 
the dependent variable is binary (0 and 1).  Thus the binary logit regression model unlike others is based on the use 
of dichotonomous dependent variable. The model developed basically relates auditor tenure with audit quality 
measured by the likelihood that a sampled company employs the services of the big audit firms in Nigeria. Namely; 
Ernst & Young, Price Water House Coopers, Akintola Williams Delliote and KPMG. Several Studies (Skinner and 
Srinivasan, 2010; Krishnamurthy, Zhon and Zhon 2002; De Angelo, 1981 and Davidson, 1993) have provided both 
empirical and theoretical justification for use of big audit firms as a proxy for audit quality. Consequently, a dummy 
value of 1 is used if a firm uses any of the big 5 auditors (Ernst & Young, Price Water House Coopers, Akintola 
Williams Delliote and KPMG) and 0 if otherwise.  In line with the empirical studies by Manry, Mock and Turner 
(2005), a number of control variables was included; Size, Roa, Board independence, Director Ownership and Board 
size.  The econometric procedure was conducted using Eviews 5.0 software. 
 
6. Measurement of Variables and Model Specification 
The following variables are considered relevant in the specification of the model examining the relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit quality.  
AUDIT QUALITY = measured by the likelihood that a sampled company employs the services one of the big audit 
firms. A dummy value of 1 is used if a firm uses any of the big 5 auditors and 0 if otherwise.    
TENURE = Measured in terms of number of years spent as auditor for Sample   company. If greater than 3, we 
assign 1, else 0.        
SIZE   = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA = Return on Assets Calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets. 
BOARDI =Board Independence measured as the proportion of external directors on the board. 
BOS=Board Size measured as the number of directors on the board. 
DOWN= Directors’ ownership measured as the percentage of ownership by directors.  
Consequently, the econometric model is specified below; 
AQ = βo + β1BOARDI + β2 BOS + β3TENURE+ β4DIROWN + β5ROA + β6SIZE +Ut    
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) binary logistic regression Technique will be used in the estimation of the various 
parameters selected in the model.  
INSERT TABLE I 
 
7. Analysis of Result 
The Result shows a multivariate binary logit regression convergence achieved after three iterations. The overall 
fitness of the model as revealed in the LR statistic of 11.43829 with Probability (LR STAT) of 0.057791 which is less 
than the standard critical p-value of 0.05. This implies that the estimated model is statistically significant at 5% level 
and thus the linearized functional specification of the model is not inappropriate. The overall explanatory power of 
the model is revealed in McFadden R- squared, shows that about 18% of the systematic variations of the dependent 
variable is explained by the independent variables which is quite low. Furthermore, the z-ratio and respective p-value 
analysis indicative of the individual statistical significance of the explanatory variables shows that an inverse 
relationship exists between Auditor tenure and Audit quality. The result could stimulate discourse on the sensibleness 
of changing auditors after a period of time as longer tenure periods may signal increasing threats and declining 
possibility for quality audits. Thus, as Barbadillo and Aguilar (2000) have also observed, the shorter the auditor’s 
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tenure, the more they behave in a dependent fashion. Other variables examined alongside auditor tenure such as 
board independence was found to be negatively related with the likelihood of quality audits. A Similar finding was 
also observed for board size which is seen to be inversely related with the probability of having quality audits as 
shown in its slope coefficient.  Director ownership and firm size were also observed to relate inversely with the 
likelihood of having quality audits. Return on assets was observed to exhibit a positive relationship with audit quality. 
However, except for board independence, all other variables were found to be statistically insignificant at the 5% 
level suggesting practically, the need for considerable caution in implying strict causality. Based on the result, we fail 
to accept the hypothesis (H0) that there is a positive relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. This 
implies that longer audit tenure may not signal audit quality. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 consolidates this view 
as it requires rotation of the lead audit partner every five years. However, the non-statistical significance of the 
variable suggests caution in implying strict causality.  
 
8.  Discussion of Findings 
The relationship between tenure and audit quality was observed to be inverse and as noted earlier, this could 
stimulate the discourse on the sensibleness of changing auditors after a period of time as it may be effective at 
increasing the level of audit quality. The study finding is in line with Barbadillo and Aguilar (2000) which found the 
relationship between the auditor tenure and audit quality to be negative and concluded that the shorter the auditor’s 
tenure, the more they behave in a dependent fashion. Findings by Mautz and Sharaf (2002) Healy and Kim, (2003) 
AICPA, (1992) Carcello and Nagy (2004) have also argued that rotation of audit firms is a way of improving audit 
quality. This is because familiarity with the client has the effect of reducing the fresh point of view auditors have in 
the early years of engagement. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prescribes a change of auditors every five years. The 
argument basically is that longer auditor- tenure tends to result in an opportunity cost of auditor independence. 
However in the Nigerian audit setting, the challenge of auditor tenure though still budding has not attracted 
significant regulatory pronouncements. Consequently, the length of auditor and client relationship is still at a much 
more discretionary level.  Though other findings such as Walker, Lewis and Casterella, (2001), Knechel and 
Vanstraelen (2007) have also argued  that auditor rotation may not necessarily improve audit quality and the effect 
of tenure does not have either an increasing or decreasing effect on audit quality and at best the effect is weak.  The 
study finding is nevertheless at variance with conclusions made by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002); Johnson, 
Khurana and Reynolds (2002) and Myers, Myers and Omer (2003) that short auditor tenure is associated with lower 
quality audits. For the other variables examined alongside tenure such as board size, board independence and director 
ownership which are all indicative of the corporate governance were found to be inversely related with audit quality. 
The finding is at variance with those of Klein (2002) Beasley (1996) Chen and Jaggi (2000) which argues that the 
presence of corporate governance enhances the tendency for better audits. However, Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 
(2005) provides mixed evidence with regards to the effects of corporate governance on audit quality. The findings for 
return on assets have also be observed to be in tandem  with Jaggi and Freedman (1992) while that of company size 
is in contrast with  O’Donovan, (1997).    
9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The objective of this work was to examine the relationship between audit partner tenure on the audit quality, 
measured by the likelihood that a sampled company employs the services of one of the big audit firms. The study 
attempts to provide empirical evidence in the Nigerian context. Findings from the study reveal that there is a negative 
relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality though the variable was not significant. The other explanatory 
variables (Returns on Assets, Board independence, and Director Ownership and Board size) were found to be 
inversely related to audit quality aside from Returns on Assets which exhibited a positive effect. Thus the debate 
about auditor tenure may be seen as still ongoing as reflected in the plethora of divergent research findings in this 
regards. A limitation of the findings may stem from the possible detection of an appropriate time period to indicate 
long or short tenure. Thus studies have utilized different time frames ranging from 3 years, 4 years or like the 
Sarbanes Oxley act which stipulates five years as an average long tenure period and these may have effects on 
empirical findings. However, the desire for quality audits that minimizes the expectation gap between suppliers of 
audit and users of audit services is globally recognized and as such x-raying the impact of auditor tenure on audit 
quality will require more ex-post evidence across different contexts. The recommendation is that there is the need for 
the Nigerian financial reporting council and other regulatory bodies in line with best practices to look critically into 
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the issue of auditor tenure and the impact on audit quality in Nigeria.     
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Table I: Presentation of Results 
Dependent Variable: AUDQUA     
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing)   
Date: 04/09/12   Time: 12:51     
Sample: 1 50     
Included observations: 50     
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations    
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 2.430303 1.607174 1.512159 0.1305 
BOARDI -3.1748 1.729074 -1.836127 0.0563 
BOS -0.00567 0.088358 -0.064157 0.9488 
DIROWN -0.40793 1.533745 -0.265972 0.7903 
ROA 1.448458 1.515006 0.956074 0.339 
SIZE -1.07E-10 9.91E-11 -1.081061 0.2797 
TENURE -0.17657 0.534356 -0.330435 0.7411 
     
McFadden R-squared 0.175053     Mean dependent var 0.64 
S.D. dependent var 0.484873     S.E. of regression 0.467789 
Akaike info criterion 1.358071     Sum squared resid 9.409543 
Schwarz criterion 1.625754     Log likelihood -26.95176 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.460006     Deviance 53.90353 
Restr. deviance 65.34182     Restr. log likelihood -32.67091 
LR statistic 11.43829     Avg. log likelihood -0.539035 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.057739    
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